Who is rebelling in syria




















Only a few months later in , Assad was interviewed by Russian-based RT. The Foreign Affairs interview was on January 26, , in which Assad blatantly denied the existence of moderate opposition. Most of them joined the Al-Qaeda […]. So, it is clear that Assad is framing the revolution as a war against terrorism in front of the Western media to justify his continued fight against the Syrian opposition.

Focusing on public speeches delivered by Bashar, paying particular attention to specific themes and the use of dialectal Arabic as strategic attempts to reach the masses through vernacular language Kesseiri, , as follows:. When President Hafez Al-Assad died in , his son Bashar inherited an authoritarian state but he lacked the power to control enough resources that would help him to rule alone. However, before he assumed office, Bashar Al-Assad had an inner circle of loyalists that was already formed by his dying father.

This close circle was a coalition of the old guards and the new guards that consisted of business elites, officials from the ruling Baath Party and high profile commanders in the army and the security forces Svolik, All fundamental conditions that facilitate democratic changes or the transition to a stable democratic system were missing in the Syrian case under Bashar.

That included the lack of both two dimensions: Liberalization public contestation and Inclusiveness, as well as competition as a major condition to emphasize the process of transition. The authoritarian upgrading had only benefited regime crony capitalists who developed their partnership with the new bourgeoisie, but it impoverished the masses and middle classes in poor neighborhoods around the cities, especially those who depended on agriculture Ismail, So, the researcher noticed that some new economic policies that benefited his close circle without producing a political transition and consolidated the power of the authoritarian regime under Bashar Al-Assad.

Third , it amended the constitution February 26, Moustafa, However, although the gradual democratic transition in Syria, widespread violence committed by the regime when opposition hard-liners started to be visible and worked to arm the uprising. This caused the regime hard-liners to push further for abandoning the reforms and instead implementing violent military repression of the uprising.

Thus, the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime hindered the achievement of a stable and peaceful democratic transition through a mass social movement. The escalation of violence had two major consequences that fundamentally changed the nature of the social movement and the demands of the protestors. The Syrian regime started to stress its legitimacy especially after the rise of Islamist groups as major players in the conflict as early as January , and to promote itself as the main player in the global war on terror.

The researcher emphasizes here on the importance of understanding the political and economic dynamics in instigating and transforming the massive protests in Syria. The Syrian crisis entered a new path after the recent developments and after the Geneva and Vienna meetings 1 and 2 , with the aim of ending this crisis. Generally, the Syrian opposition agreed on the following accepted principles in any political speech by the Assad regime, as follows.

So, linking between the atonement terrorism groups and the legal demands of the Syrians to determine the political fate of Syria by the Western powers, it is a dangerous indicator for those who promote this strategy regionally and internationally El-Abidine, While the penitential groups revealed the implementation of their sinister intentions and that they do not have mercy on even the former and current allies with them, the foreign protectors of this group have unfortunately not yet understood this fact.

The effective and long-term fight against terrorism, and this of course, along with the unavoidable necessary military and security actions, require comprehensive, deep social, cultural and economic solutions, which are not addressed, so military and even political solutions will remain temporary and not permanent. This requires achieving the following steps: The first step in the solution to the crisis is the immediate cease-fire, an end to the bloodshed and comprehensive international coordination to combat terrorism and this will pave the way for the subsequent parallel steps.

In the short term, until reaching a political solution, the unavoidable necessity is to meet the immediate needs of refugees outside Syria and the internally displaced Roj, All players, partners in the process of ending the crisis, must put an end to sterile and non-existent policies based on the exploitation of terrorism, all forms of terrorism can be considered a pariah and the players who spent huge sums and provided support to groups who lost their legitimacy in Syria and the region and caused a state of instability and insecurity, should put an end to their policies in this regard.

The priority here is to refrain them from buying the oil that ISIS sells, and to stop the financial transfers to this terrorist organization and to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the region Tawadros, Unification of all Syrian opposition groups under a unified leadership to easily negotiate internally and internationally. The division of the Syrian opposition was observed from the first days of the Syrian revolution, such as the National Council, the Coalition, the High Commissioners Commission […], etc.

So, the demand for the formation of a political body that expresses the revolution for reaching a common acceptable opposite leadership to negotiate on the political solution and the future of the Syrian state is a prerequisite condition for any solution Rajab, So, the researcher recommends that the foreign players, especially Russia, instead of seeking to intervene and impose their conditions, must, within the unconditional confrontation against known atonement groups, extend a hand of assistance to the government and the Syrian opposition to begin the process of the Syrian-Syrian dialogue and work to take the first steps for political accommodation to achieve national reconciliation and move toward an exit from the current crisis by resorting to the Syrian public opinion.

Syrian sects agreed on the nature of the acceptable political demands such as : setting democratic structures and principles, designing the constitution and free elections. Some analysts confirmed that even if the Assad regime is now willing to tolerate some limited opposition, there is no indication it is actually interested in sharing power or engaging that opposition in any substantive political dialogue Ahmed, The most important common political demands are: Calling for real national integrity of Syria and unifying all identities under a unified leadership.

Building Syrian political organizations as democratic organizations, encouraging democratic communication among its members and translating their knowledge into procedural recommendations, revolving around the way in which these organizations can practice democratic behavior in the reality of living. Adopting the issue of democracy and human rights, on the theoretical and practical levels, where many political formations still complain about the shrinking frameworks of democratic practice, other opinion and dialogue, within and with others and the travesty and verbal language is only tangible evidence of that Kleib, Adopting the strategy of building the future of a Syrian state of law the state of legal and constitutional institutions with sovereignty and independent decisions internally and externally.

Here, the researcher adopted the view that: the Syrian regime under Bashar Al-Assad can only think in terms of concluding deals in closed rooms. The regime is transactional; its more amenable, constructive-minded domestic opposition has nothing to offer in trade and so the regime seems comfortable disregarding it. In short, we can analyze the accepted demands of all Syrians, and addressing all attempts of external hegemony that targeted the existence of Syria as a state, by mobilizing the energies of the Syrians and their popular groups in a long struggle and multiple methods and tools, at all levels.

Here, the researcher tries to summarize the common demands and standards for the Syrian political leadership discourse, as follows: First : Respecting the demands and will of the Syrian people in determining their destiny, managing and adjusting their affairs on their own and expediting the process of transformation and political transition.

Second : Opposing external interference to impose foreign conditions on the Syrian people, in all shades and doctrines. Third : Refusing to use terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals in internal conflicts in Syria, and rejecting all previous speeches of Bashar al-Assad in linking them to the legitimate and moderate Syrian opposition to terrorism. Fourth : Reaching a multi-disciplinary and unified political discourse at the same time on the basis of the Syrian national constants that include all Syrians, through which the National Compass has served the Syrians at all levels.

It is the Syrian national discourse Mahfoud, Fifth : Achieving the Syrian Openness around the world, Opening up to all the world powers countries, organizations, parties, […] etc. Hence, the researcher after a deeper analysis of the Syrian crisis could easily reach to the main target as a solution for the current crisis, which is represented in respecting the opposite discourses to the regime and reaching to comprehensive solutions on contentious issues by adopting a national political discourse by the Syrian opposition, which includes all colors of the political and cultural spectrum for all of Syrians and avoids sectarian, ethnic, national and geographic groups.

The ruling Syrian regime believes, at the level of the mind behind its violent behavior, which determines its way of thinking, the deliberate confusion on its part in all subsequent political speeches after the outbreak of the revolution in Syria between the state, the country, the authority and the symbolic leader and other concepts through which it seeks to secure the elements of strength necessary to exercise his convictions Heidmann, From here, one can set future scenarios to control acceptable concepts in political speeches addressed to the Syrian masses, regardless of their affiliation, as follows:.

The ambiguity and mixing of concepts in the discourses of President Bashar Al-Assad post the Syrian Revolution are his problem to practice power on the level. Language of the discourses of Bashar al-Assad was always the way of his deviation to control the Public opinion, and the country is considered personal property. It appears — from this point — that the mentality of Bashar al-Assad while delivering his speeches is structurally stable and therefore, any penetration made by the opposition in the path of clarifying an accurate confirmation of concepts is a path toward freedom Seifan, This process is an important intellectual goal as a tool for change of the current authoritarian regime.

Syrian sects should work as much as possible to separate the personality of Bashar al-Assad from the subject of politics, and dealing with the issues in his discoursed after the revolution objectively, non-ideologically, to achieve the comprehensive Syrian national interest for the good of Syria and the Syrians.

Supposing that : The acceptable and comprehensive discourse — if achieved by the Syrians — will certainly set the stage for an inclusive national discourse capable of creating a solid Syrian agreement ground: in such case, the new language in discourse will wrap in the existential instinct which all Syrians should build, to replace the solid sectarian nucleus that the regime created for itself and through which it ran the country.

Points of identifying the acceptable language in the political discourse should adopt a professionalism method of the politician and the objectivity: a distinction must be made between the social, cultural and political levels, with a good definition for terminologies and terms. Thus, Syrian policy becomes the craft of building a new country, in the philosophical, political, social and functional sense of the state Barout, The acceptable collective comprehensive discourse cannot be achieved in Syria without exceeding the local view of thought, awareness and orientation: to benefit by the experiences of the world and human history on the stage of successful revolutions and to form a collective Syrian awareness, close to reality and understand it accurately and seek to develop and change it Fakhr El-Din, Finally, Syrian sects should distinguish between a group of concepts in discourses that need to be controlled and to be specific, and others need sculpting and formation: The semantic field of concepts should differ according to the new demands of all Syrians after the revolution for the new reality that makes the Syrian citizen becomes the aim of addressing any upcoming policies.

His rhetoric delivers the impression that he is the solution for Syria. While some in rebellious Homs funded the opposition, in wealthier Aleppo and Damascus they largely remained quiet. There was also genuine ideological support for Assad. From the beginning, Assad insisted the rebellion was an externally orchestrated plot and, after a lifetime of absorbing propaganda, some believed him.

Others feared political instability. The regime cynically cultivated supporters by introducing a sliver of reform, such as a new constitution. Another key ploy was a campaign of intimidation. Many were scarred by memories of the last rebellion against an Assad, when Hafez massacred at least 10, in Hama in The post repression was an amplified imitation of that. While many bravely risked their lives, others were evidently deterred. The government preferred to crush them rather than reform, yet it recognized that the population would not stomach unjustified violence.

So, it concocted a legitimizing narrative: It portrayed the oppositionists as violent, foreign, sectarian Islamists. Having constructed its false narrative, the regime set about making it real. Peaceful organizers were specifically targeted, and by July , 8, people had been detained, facing torture, sexual assault, and humiliation. When the opposition ultimately shifted to a violent struggle, many of the nonviolent activists who might have resisted were in prison, exiled, or dead.

The regime later prioritized the fight against moderate opponents while leaving embryonic ISIS largely unharmed. This was partly pragmatic, as ISIS was in the peripheral east while other rebels threatened the western heartlands, but it was also strategic. Just as Assad targeted the non-violent opponents to ensure the rebellion turned violent, he focused on moderate armed rebels in the hope that only jihadists and his regime would be left for Syrians and the world to choose from.

Had there been no external involvement, these domestic ploys might have been enough for Assad to survive. But the uprising quickly became internationalized. Western governments called on Assad to stand aside in August , and imposed sanctions. Regional governments led by Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia cut ties. Moscow and Tehran gave vital economic lifelines to offset the impact of sanctions and war.

Assad has made his allies think he's indispensable. Both governments also provided key military assistance. Iran initially sent weapons and advisers but increased its role after several Assad defeats in Russia also offered arms early on, and intervened directly with its air force in , when Assad looked vulnerable.

This is what ultimately turned the tide, allowing Assad to retake key regions from the rebels and ISIS. Vladimir Putin consequently became the key powerbroker, striking deals with Iran, Turkey, and the U. Foreign governments favored emigres over internal activists when they sponsored governments in exile such as the Syrian Opposition Coalition SOC. Turkey and Qatar empowered Islamists within these bodies, notably the exiled Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.

This drew ire from Saudi Arabia, which loathed the Brotherhood, and prompted Qatari- and Saudi-backed factionalism within the opposition.

Since the start of the war, the situation in Syria became much more complicated, as other countries and organized fighters have entered the picture. The United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and other western countries are described as supporters of moderate rebel groups.

Many newer rebel groups have emerged since the war began. The ongoing conflict also encouraged terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, to join in on the chaos. These groups are primarily made up of Sunni militants.

To further complicate the dynamics, the United States has also led an international bombing campaign against ISIS targets since In April of and , the United States launched military attacks against chemical weapons sites in Syria. After the attack, U. President Donald Trump told the press: "The purpose of our actions tonight is to establish a strong deterrent against the production, spread and use of chemical weapons. Establishing this deterrent is a vital national security interest of the United States.

The combined American, British and French response to these atrocities will integrate all instruments of our national power—military, economic, and diplomatic. The conflict has spawned a humanitarian and refugee crisis of massive proportions. Experts estimate that Nearly 3 million of these people live in hard-to-reach areas. More than 5.



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